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Abstract 
 
Cross-national models of party system fragmentation hold that social diversity and district 
magnitude interact: higher levels of district magnitude allow for greater expression of social 
diversity that leads to higher levels of party system fragmentation. Most models, however, ignore 
differences between majoritarian and proportional electoral rules, which may significantly alter 
the impact of district magnitude, as well as the way in which district magnitude impacts the 
translation of social cleavages into party system fragmentation. Examining the case of Singapore 
suggests majoritarian multimember districts limit party system fragmentation, particularly by 
reducing the degree to which ethnic and religious diversity are translated into political parties. 
Applying these insights to a standard cross-national model of party system fragmentation, the 
results suggest that majoritarian multimember districts produce lower levels of party system 
fragmentation than proportional multimember districts.   
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Cross-national models of party system fragmentation hold that social diversity and 
district magnitude interact: higher levels of district magnitude allow for greater 
expression of social diversity that leads to higher levels of party system fragmentation. 
Most models, however, ignore differences between majoritarian and proportional 
electoral rules, which may significantly alter the impact of district magnitude, as well as 
the way in which district magnitude impacts the translation of social cleavages into party 
system fragmentation. Examining the case of Singapore suggests majoritarian 
multimember districts limit party system fragmentation, particularly by reducing the 
degree to which ethnic and religious diversity are translated into political parties. 
Applying these insights to a standard cross-national model of party system fragmentation, 
the results suggest that majoritarian multimember districts produce lower levels of party 
system fragmentation than proportional multimember districts.
1
   
 
Previous research shows that the fragmentation of the party system – both in terms of the 
number of parties and the degree to which votes are distributed across these parties – is 
determined in large part by the diversity of countries’ social cleavage structures and the electoral 
system(s) in which elections are conducted. This literature argues that higher levels of social 
diversity lead to more fragmented party systems, particularly in proportional representation (PR) 
electoral systems with high levels of district magnitude (the number of seats awarded per 
district). Using measures of ethnic diversity as proxies for social diversity more generally, these 
expectations have been borne out in previous studies showing that party systems become more 
fragmented as district magnitude increases (e.g. Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006; Singer and Stephenson, 
2009).  
That being said, these models do not account for differences between those higher-
magnitude electoral systems awarding seats using proportional rules versus those employing 
majoritarian rules. While there may be a positive relationship between district magnitude and 
party system fragmentation in countries using proportional rules, this conclusion may not be 
supported in countries using majoritarian rules. In majoritarian systems, it may be that higher 
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levels of district magnitude make party competition more, not less, difficult (see, e.g., Taagepera 
and Shugart, 1989: 265; Taagepera, 2007: 177-182). Moreover, the positive relationship between 
social diversity and party system fragmentation seen in previous research may be similarly 
confined to PR systems, with higher levels of district magnitude in majoritarian systems limiting 
the impact of social diversity (or even leading to lower levels of party system fragmentation).  
To illustrate how this may be the case, I examine the experience of majoritarian 
multimember districts in Singapore. The use of multimember districts in Singapore since 1988 
suggests district magnitude in majoritarian systems is not necessarily associated with more 
fragmented party systems, as is the case in countries using PR systems. If anything, the case of 
Singapore suggests higher levels of district magnitude may reduce the degree to which ethnic 
and religious diversity are translated into higher levels of party system fragmentation. 
Incorporating these insights into cross-national models of party system fragmentation suggests 
the experience of Singapore is not unique: accounting for differences between PR and 
majoritarian systems shows that higher levels of district magnitude in majoritarian systems do 
not lead to significantly more fragmented party systems – and in some cases, such systems are 
associated with less fragmented party systems.  
In the next section, I discuss the explanations that have been used in previous research to 
account for variation in party system fragmentation. Using the example of Singapore, but aiming 
towards generalization, I then turn to explore how majoritarian multimember districts put 
downward pressure on party system fragmentation by constraining the effects of social diversity. 
Following that, I conduct an empirical analysis demonstrating that incorporating these insights 
into a standard model used to explain party system fragmentation cross-nationally improves our 
understanding of how electoral systems and social cleavages interact to determine the size of the 
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party system. A final section concludes with a discussion of the implications these findings have 
for future research.  
 
Previous Research 
The logic underpinning studies of party system fragmentation derives from two principal 
literatures. One is rooted in the social cleavage tradition. Derived in large part from the work by 
Lipset and Rokkan (1967; see also Lipset, 1960; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), this literature argues 
that social diversity provides incentives for parties to form and represent particular social groups 
and the values associated with belonging to these groups (while voters, in turn, have incentives 
to support the party representing their social group). As a result, this literature predicts that 
higher levels of social diversity will be associated with higher levels of party system 
fragmentation.  
The other major literature is rooted primarily in the work of Duverger (1963), who 
argued that the fragmentation of party systems can be understood as the product of two 
processes: electoral systems and the social structures potentially giving rise to the formation of 
parties. Regarding the impact of electoral systems, Duverger is best known for his ‘law’ stating 
that the number of parties in electoral districts electing only one representative on the basis of 
who wins the most votes (even if such a number only constitutes a plurality) will not exceed two 
in equilibrium. This is due to the phenomenon of tactical voting, whereby voters desert third-
party candidates that choose to run (whether these candidates defy the incentives provided by the 
electoral system knowingly or not) in favour of one of the top-two candidates in their district 
because their preferred parties have no chance of winning the seat (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 
1972; Cox, 1997). Though party system fragmentation in practice often exceeds two-party 
5 
 
predictions (e.g. Singer, 2013), the fact remains that single-member district plurality systems put 
downward pressure on the formation and success of third parties (Rae, 1967; Lijphart, 1990; 
Clark and Golder, 2006; Singer and Stephenson, 2009).  
By the same logic, Duverger’s hypothesis predicts that PR systems will be associated 
with multiparty systems. The primary marker of electoral system proportionality is district 
magnitude (herein abbreviated as M): districts electing more than one representative and 
awarding seats on the basis of proportionality to one’s vote share give third parties a better 
chance of winning seats, which in turn provides voters with incentives to vote for third parties. 
As M increases, party system fragmentation increases – provided that the social structure creates 
sufficient pressures for the formation of parties.  
Building on these insights, previous research has developed a model explaining how 
electoral systems and social structures interact and determine party system fragmentation, with 
social diversity producing higher levels of party system fragmentation (per Lipset and Rokkan), 
particularly in large-M electoral systems awarding seats based on the principle of proportionality 
(per Duverger’s hypothesis). Previous literature applying this model across a broad range of 
countries and elections concludes that social diversity is positively associated with party system 
fragmentation, particularly in PR systems electing large numbers of representatives per district 
(Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Geys, 2006; Clark and Golder, 
2006; Singer and Stephenson, 2009). Even though other research – responding to the problems of 
using ethnicity as the sole marker of social diversity as most previous research has done (Stoll, 
2008) – shows that religious diversity puts downward pressure on party system fragmentation 
(Raymond, 2016), the relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation 
becomes positive at higher levels of M.  
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Despite the considerable body of evidence suggesting higher values of M allow for 
greater fragmentation of the party system, there is reason to question the conclusion that higher 
levels of M lead to higher levels of party system fragmentation in all cases. This is because most 
research fails to distinguish between multimember districts awarding seats according to 
proportional rules versus those using majoritarian rules. This distinction is potentially important, 
as the prediction of a positive association between M and party system fragmentation is 
predicated on the use of PR. As previous research has noted (Lakeman, 1970; Taagepera and 
Shugart, 1989: 265; Taagepera, 2007: 177-182), higher levels of M in majoritarian systems make 
competition more difficult for smaller parties in ways that should reduce, not increase, party 
system fragmentation. Additionally, although M in majoritarian systems may put downward 
pressure on the number of viable parties, it could be that the most important effect of M in 
majoritarian systems is the impact of M on the ways in which social cleavages shape party 
system fragmentation. Though higher levels of social diversity translate into greater party system 
fragmentation at higher levels of M in PR systems, higher values of M in majoritarian systems 
may weaken the effect of ethnic and religious diversity, perhaps even leading to lower levels of 
party system fragmentation.  
This debate regarding the difference in the effects of M and social diversity between 
majoritarian and PR systems may have important consequences for managing conflict in diverse 
societies. One perspective, drawing from consociational theory (Lijphart, 1977; 2007), argues 
that the best way to manage conflicts in socially diverse contexts is to employ PR systems that 
give parliamentary representation to parties representing each group separately. By securing 
representation for all relevant groups, consociational theory maintains that the resulting 
fragmentation of the party system will prevent any one group from dominating policymaking, 
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which in turn will compel parties to cooperate and share power peacefully. Others, however, 
contend that cooperation across social group lines cannot be guaranteed under such segmented 
representation and fear that excessive fragmentation will only lead to political gridlock that leads 
to conflict (Horowitz, 1985; 2014; Reilly, 2012). Instead of promoting party system 
fragmentation, centripetalist scholars argue that peace is best achieved by employing 
majoritarian electoral systems in order to compel social groups to cooperate in support of the 
same parties. If one is concerned with excessive party system fragmentation in diverse societies, 
then the discussion above suggests constitutional designers may want to use higher, not lower, 
values of M with majoritarian seat allocation rules in order to constrain party system 
fragmentation. This, however, assumes that majoritarian systems constrain the effects of social 
diversity on party system fragmentation. The next section explores how this may be the case.  
 
District Magnitude, Social Diversity, and Party System Fragmentation in Singapore 
One case that illustrates the impact of majoritarian multimember districts on the degree to 
which social diversity is translated into party system fragmentation is Singapore. Though 
elections are conducted freely and without much corruption, Singapore is a one-party dominant 
state that has been ruled by the People’s Action Party (PAP) since independence (Ganesan, 
1998). The PAP has always garnered more than 60 percent of the vote, while opposition parties 
have been weak and divided. As a result, party system fragmentation has been limited despite 
Singapore’s moderate levels of ethnic diversity, high levels of religious diversity, and the 
adoption of multimember districts for elections from 1988 on. The lack of party system 
fragmentation can be seen in Figure 1, which presents the effective number of electoral parties 
(or ENEP: see Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), a measure that calculates party system 
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fragmentation by counting each party and weighting it by its share of the total vote.
2
 Since 
independence, party system fragmentation has fluctuated between 1.31 and 2.51 effective parties, 
with an average of 2.0 effective parties.  
Figure 1 about here 
Part of the reason for the lack of viable challengers was due to the use of a single-
member district plurality electoral system, which Singapore inherited from Britain and used until 
1984. From 1988, however, Singapore has used a mix of single-member and group 
representation constituencies with as many as six members elected per district. Despite the 
adoption of multimember districts, there has been little appreciable change in party system 
fragmentation. This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows that – despite the increase in M in 
1988 – ENEP has not increased appreciably since Singapore began using multimember districts 
in 1988. In fact, one of the biggest election-to-election increases in party system fragmentation 
occurred prior to the adoption of multimember districts. This shows that multimember districts 
have not produced the increases in party system fragmentation one would expect based on 
models assuming that higher levels of M lead to more fragmented party systems.  
Instead of promoting party system fragmentation, multimember districts were introduced 
as an attempt to increase the representation of ethnic minorities and promote a sense of national 
solidarity. Specifically, the government feared ethnic minorities – namely, the Malay, but also 
the Indian community – would lose a sense of identification with the state if they remained 
underrepresented in Parliament. Through group representation constituencies, which require that 
ethnic minority candidates are placed on the ballot as part of each party’s team of candidates in 
the constituency, the government sought to reduce ethnic tensions by increasing M.  
This decision had partisan consequences. Namely, it strengthened the position of PAP 
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and reduced the viability of smaller parties. Seats in group representation constituencies are 
awarded on a majoritarian basis: the party that wins a plurality elects all its candidates. As a 
result, parties have to gather as many candidates as there are seats in order to run in group 
representation constituencies. In most cases, only the PAP has the resources and appeal to attract 
sufficient numbers of candidates to run across ethnic group lines in constituencies electing six 
seats. Even without the requirement of ethnically balanced candidate slates, higher M limits the 
effect of ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation because ethnically exclusive parties are 
not viable in majoritarian multimember districts: owing to their size, ethnic groups constituting a 
small share of the population are unable to propel ethnically exclusive parties to victory, and thus 
must cooperate with other ethnic groups in order to form parties with sufficient support to elect 
candidates.  
We can see evidence of the degree to which majoritarian multimember districts constrain 
the effects of ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation when looking at the breakdown of 
the vote going to the PAP versus all opposition parties among the major ethnic groups in 
Singapore. Table 1 presents this information using data from the sixth wave of the World Values 
Survey (2015). Despite moderate levels of ethnic diversity, each of the major ethnic groups in 
Singapore votes overwhelmingly for the PAP.  This stands in contrast to the expectations drawn 
from previous models of party system fragmentation assuming that higher levels of M lead to 
higher levels of party system fragmentation as different ethnic groups support different parties. 
Instead, the data in Table 1 show that voters are not significantly divided along ethnic group 
lines.  
Table 1 about here 
In addition to the impact of majoritarian rules on the relationship between ethnic diversity 
10 
 
and party system fragmentation in multimember districts, there is also reason to believe 
majoritarian rules may have similar consequences for the effects of religious diversity. While 
previous research suggests the relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation shifts from negative to positive as M increases (Raymond, 2016), the impact of M 
on this relationship may differ significantly between countries awarding seats according to 
majoritarian and proportional rules. In PR systems, higher M increases the chance that religious 
groups may be able to form and elect their own parties, and thus one would expect to see a 
positive relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation in PR systems. 
In majoritarian multimember districts, however, winning seats is not only more difficult when 
compared to PR systems, but the consequences of losing any one multimember district are 
amplified relative to elections in single-member districts. Given that the pressures created by 
religiously diversity for religious groups to cooperate in support of a winning party that can 
promote their values (see Raymond, 2016, pp. 367-368), the extra-majoritarian conditions 
created by majoritarian multimember districts should exaggerate the effects of religious 
diversity. As a result, one would expect the negative association between religious diversity and 
party system fragmentation to intensify as M increases in majoritarian electoral systems.   
There is certainly reason to believe that if religious diversity puts downward pressure on 
party system fragmentation, and if this effect is intensified by the use of majoritarian 
multimember districts, then Singapore’s high levels of religious diversity may also help to 
explain its one-party dominant system. Singapore is one of the most religiously diverse countries 
in the world (even more so than it is ethnically diverse). Rather than competing against one 
another, however, (as most interpretations of Lipset and Rokkan would suggest), religious 
groups cooperate well with one another in support of the largest party, the PAP. This can be seen 
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in Table 2, which presents the percentages of each religious group voting for the PAP versus all 
opposition parties using data from the sixth wave of the World Values Survey (2015). The data 
show that overwhelming majorities of each religious group express support for the PAP. While 
this level of support for the PAP varies across religious groups – ranging from 82.9 percent of 
Jews supporting the PAP to only 66.7 percent among Taoists – the fact remains that the 
overwhelming majority of voters in each religious group support the PAP. Similar to the (non-) 
effect of ethnic diversity, the data in Table 2 stand in contrast to the expectations of previous 
literature: rather than dividing more clearly along religious group lines as M increases, the data in 
Table 2 show that the overwhelming majority of each religious group’s members support the 
PAP.  
Table 2 about here 
While the data in Table 2 cannot demonstrate that the use of majoritarian multimember 
districts intensifies the negative effect of religious diversity, the evidence is consistent with this 
interpretation. The fact that the overwhelming majority of each religious group supports PAP – 
instead of some groups dividing in support of PAP and others dividing in support of the largest 
opposition party – suggests the extra-majoritarian conditions created by the use of majoritarian 
multimember districts compel religious groups to cohere politically more than might otherwise 
be expected under other, less majoritarian electoral rules. In keeping with the lack of division 
observed among Singapore’s ethnic groups, the lack of division among religious groups suggests 
the use of majoritarian multimember districts does not lead to greater party system 
fragmentation, and instead leads to reduced levels of fragmentation.  
Although Singapore’s low levels of party system fragmentation are likely due in part to 
the fact the government has compelled parties to run candidates across ethnic group lines, the 
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impact of majoritarian multimember districts seen here may be generalizable to other countries 
that do not mandate such cross-community cooperation. In keeping with previous research 
showing that M puts downward pressure on party system fragmentation (Lakeman, 1970; 
Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Taagepera, 2007), the example of Singapore suggests that we 
should observe a negative relationship between M and party system fragmentation in 
majoritarian systems. Moreover, because Singapore’s use of group representation constituencies 
was explicitly designed to reduce the divisive impact of social diversity on party support 
(independently of the legal requirement to field multi-ethnic candidate lists), there is additional 
reason to believe that higher levels of M in other majoritarian countries may reduce party system 
size by weakening the impact of ethnic and religious diversity on the fragmentation of the party 
system. The next section examines whether this is the case.  
 
Data Analysis 
To test whether the insights from the case study of Singapore have broader cross-national 
implications, I incorporated the effects of majoritarian multimember districts into a standard 
model of party system fragmentation discussed above (see Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; 
Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997; Clark and Golder, 2006). The dependent variable is party system 
fragmentation, which is measured using the ENEP measure described above.
3
 Ethnic and 
religious diversity are similarly measured as the effective number of ethnic groups (Ethnic) and 
the effective number of religious groups (Religious). Following the practice of Clark and Golder 
(2006), I use data from Fearon (2003) to measure ethnic diversity. The measure of religious 
diversity uses data from Pew (2011, 2014). This measure captures the percentages who are 
Christian religions (which are broken down into Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and other), 
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Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, not affiliated with religion, and all others. To account 
for possible curvilinear relationships between ethnic diversity and religious diversity on the one 
hand and party system fragmentation on the other (Raymond, 2015), I take the natural logarithm 
of both ethnic diversity (LogEthnic) and religious diversity (LogReligious).  
In addition to ethnic diversity, the model includes several other predictors of party system 
fragmentation:  
 
LogM: the (logged) mean M; as M increases, party system fragmentation increases. 
 
LogEthnic x LogM: the interaction between LogEthnic and LogM; the effect of LogM is assumed 
to be conditional on LogEthnic, leading to increases in party system fragmentation only in 
ethnically diverse contexts. 
 
LogReligious x LogM: the interaction between LogReligious and LogM.  
 
Upper Tier: the percentage of representatives elected in a proportional upper tier; the higher the 
percentage, the greater party system fragmentation will be.
4
 
 
ENPRES: the effective number of candidates in presidential elections (this variable takes a value 
of zero in parliamentary systems); more fragmented presidential party systems lead to more 
fragmented legislative party systems.  
 
Proximity: the time elapsed between legislative and presidential elections, scaled to range 
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between zero – legislative and presidential elections are held as far apart from one another as 
possible, or no presidential elections are held – and one – when both elections are held 
simultaneously (see Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997). 
 
ENPRES x Proximity: the interaction between ENPRES and Proximity; the impact of ENPRES 
may be stronger in legislative elections held closer in time to the presidential election.  
  
I also include a variable measuring the differences between the effects of M in 
majoritarian and PR systems. This variable is coded one for PR systems and zero for majoritarian 
systems. Elections are deemed to be majoritarian if they were held under one of the following 
electoral systems: two round, alternative vote, block vote, limited vote, single non-transferable 
vote, and single-member district plurality systems. I then create interactions between this 
variable and LogM, LogEthnic, LogReligious, and the interactions among these variables 
(resulting in two three-way interactions: Non-Majoritarian Systems × LogM × LogEthnic and 
Non-Majoritarian Systems × LogM × LogReligious). This leaves majoritarian systems as the 
baseline, which in turn allows one to interpret the effects of ethnic/religious diversity and 
multimember districts in majoritarian systems more easily when looking at the coefficients.  
The specific data set used here was compiled by Bormann and Golder (2013). This data 
set consists of elections to the lower houses of legislatures in countries around the world between 
1946 and 2011.
5
 Countries are included if they meet a minimum threshold of democracy, defined 
by Alvarez et al. (1996), which treats countries as democratic only if there has been a peaceful 
turnover in power after an election. Though this measure is strongly correlated with other 
measures of democracy (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002; Norris, 2008), this criterion – and, thus, 
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this data set – omits countries with unbroken elections that not only meet standards of free and 
fair conduct, but also meet other definitions of democracy. This includes Singapore, which is 
omitted from the data set due to the lack of party turnover in the country’s electoral history – 
despite the fact Singapore’s democracy rating on other measures surpasses some of those 
countries included in the Bormann and Golder data set. Though the results presented here omit 
Singapore, re-estimating the models after including Singaporean elections produces results 
similar to those presented here (see the supplemental file).  
Table 3 presents parameter estimates for the model outlined above. To estimate this 
model, I use ordinary least squares linear regression. Because the Bormann and Golder data set 
includes multiple elections for some countries, which means standard errors may be 
underestimated due to the correlation among observations within the same country, I follow the 
practice of Clark and Golder (2006) and cluster standard errors by country.
6
  
Table 3 about here 
The coefficients indicate some initial support for the expectations. Although the partial 
effect of LogM is positive (indicating that higher levels of M lead to greater party system 
fragmentation in majoritarian systems – as is the case in PR systems), this effect is reduced as 
ethnic and religious diversity increase (as implied by the negative coefficients for the interactions 
with LogEthnic and LogReligious). Moreover, as indicated by the negative coefficients for the 
interactions with LogM), the effects of ethnic and religious diversity similarly weaken as LogM 
increases.  
Due to the difficulty of interpreting interaction effects from examining coefficients alone 
(Brambor, Clark, and Golder, 2006), I also generate several graphs illustrating the marginal 
effects of LogEthnic, LogReligious, and LogM.  Figure 2 presents the average marginal effects 
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due to a one-unit increase in LogEthnic and LogReligious (corresponding to increases from one 
to effectively 2.72 ethnic/religious groups), conditional on LogM. All other variables are held to 
their (majoritarian sample-specific) median values. I restrict each graph to the majoritarian 
sample-specific range of LogM.  
Figure 2 about here 
Beginning with the effects of ethnic diversity, we see that while the effect of ethnic 
diversity in PR systems is positive (but not statistically significant) in low-M systems, this effect 
intensifies and becomes statistically significant at higher values of M – in keeping with previous 
literature. In majoritarian systems, the opposite pattern appears: while the effect of ethnic 
diversity is positive and statistically significant in low-M systems, this effect becomes negative 
(though fails to reach statistical significance) as LogM increases. Similar findings emerge when 
looking at the effect of religious diversity. In keeping with Raymond (2016), though the effect of 
LogReligious in PR systems is negative at low levels of LogM, this effect becomes positive at 
higher levels of LogM. In majoritarian systems, however, the effect of LogReligious is negative 
across the entire range of LogM. While the confidence intervals are wide at higher levels of 
LogM, Figure 2 suggests the negative relationship between religious diversity and party system 
fragmentation intensifies in majoritarian systems as M increases.  
These results suggest that differences between majoritarian and PR systems have 
important consequences for the translation of social cleavages into party system fragmentation. 
In keeping with the experience of Singapore detailed above, the results in Figure 2 suggest that 
majoritarian systems limit the impact of both ethnic and religious diversity on party system 
fragmentation. While increases in both measures of diversity lead to greater levels of party 
system fragmentation in PR systems – particularly as LogM increases – ethnic and religious 
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diversity do not necessarily lead to higher levels of party system fragmentation in countries 
employing majoritarian electoral systems – again, especially as LogM increases. In fact, LogM 
may actually lead to lower levels of fragmentation by limiting the effects of ethnic/religious 
diversity.  
Turning to the estimated effects of LogM, Figure 3 presents the average marginal effects 
due to an increase in LogM from 0 to 1 (corresponding to an increase from M = 0 to M = 2.72), 
conditional first on ethnic, then religious diversity, in both PR and majoritarian systems. As 
above, all other variables are held to their median values. Each graph is restricted to the 
majoritarian sample-specific ranges of LogEthnic and LogReligious.  
Figure 3 about here 
The estimated effects of LogM seen in Figure 3 show that, as predicted by previous 
research, higher values of LogM lead to more positive effects on ENEP in PR systems, 
particularly in ethnically and/or religiously diverse contexts. In contrast, what are positive effects 
of LogM at lower levels of ethnic/religious diversity in majoritarian systems weaken to the point 
that the effects of LogM become negative at higher levels of ethnic and religious diversity. While 
the estimated effects of LogM in PR systems remain positive – and statistically significant in 
more religiously diverse contexts – the negative effects of LogM in majoritarian systems do not 
reach statistical significance. The fact the effects of LogM do not reach statistical significance 
whilst the effects of LogEthnic and LogReligious do suggests that while majoritarian 
multimember districts intensify the majoritarian quality of elections that produces negative 
relationships between ethnic/religious diversity and party system fragmentation, M itself does not 
directly reduce party system fragmentation in majoritarian systems. Instead, majoritarian 
multimember districts reduce party system fragmentation by constraining the effects of social 
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diversity.  
To see the implications of these effects for the overall levels of party system 
fragmentation observed in majoritarian systems, I present several predicted values of party 
system fragmentation at different levels of LogEthnic, LogReligious, and LogM. Specifically, I 
estimate three sets of predicted values assuming different levels of LogEthnic and LogReligious: 
one assuming moderate levels of both ethnic and religious diversity (holding both variables to 
their majoritarian-specific medians), another assuming high levels of ethnic and low levels of 
religious diversity (holding ethnic diversity at the upper quartile and religious diversity at the 
lower quartile), and a third assuming low levels of ethnic and high levels of religious diversity 
(holding ethnic diversity at the lower quartile and religious diversity at the upper quartile). For 
each of these contexts, I estimate three predicted values assuming differences in the electoral 
system to illustrate how social diversity interacts with the electoral system: one assuming LogM 
= 0 in majoritarian systems, a second assuming LogM = 1 in majoritarian systems and a third 
assuming LogM = 1 in PR systems. All other variables are held at their median values.  
Figure 4 about here 
The predicted values in Figure 4 suggest that while multimember districts increase party 
system fragmentation in PR systems, multimember districts in majoritarian systems may help to 
limit fragmentation. In all three contexts of social diversity, the use of majoritarian multimember 
districts is associated with lower levels of party system fragmentation than both multimember 
districts in PR systems and majoritarian single-member district systems. This is particularly the 
case for countries with high levels of religious diversity and low levels of ethnic diversity, where 
the use of majoritarian multimember districts intensifies the impact of religious diversity to the 
point that it reduces party system fragmentation to levels that may be too low for comfort for 
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some constitutional designers. Consistent with the finding that majoritarian multimember 
districts reduce the impact of ethnic diversity on party system fragmentation (as seen in Figure 
2), Figure 4 suggests that majoritarian multimember districts also limit party system 
fragmentation in countries with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Thus, for constitutional 
designers looking to limit excessive party system fragmentation along ethnic/religious group 
lines, majoritarian multimember districts may help to constrain such fragmentation (certainly 
relative to PR systems).  
Taken together, the results presented above help us to understand differences in party 
system fragmentation between majoritarian and PR systems and the impact of social diversity 
and M. As seen with both ethnic and religious diversity, increases in social diversity in 
majoritarian systems do not lead to the same degrees of party system fragmentation as seen in PR 
systems. This leads to the conclusion that the effects of social diversity leading to greater party 
system fragmentation are constrained in majoritarian systems. While the results suggest M is not 
as directly responsible for the low levels of party system fragmentation observed in majoritarian 
systems like Singapore, the results show that higher levels of M do have a significant conditional 
effect that constrains the impact of social diversity into party system fragmentation – and, at 
times, reducing party system fragmentation – as M increases.  
 
Conclusion 
A large body of previous research examining the determinants of party system 
fragmentation assumes an interaction between M and social cleavages, arguing that higher levels 
of M intensify the effect of social cleavages, leading to higher levels of party system 
fragmentation. However, most research does not distinguish between majoritarian and PR 
20 
 
systems, and as a result most models assume the effects of M under the two types of electoral 
systems are equivalent. Given differences in the likelihood of winning seats between the two 
types of electoral systems, the impact of M may differ significantly in majoritarian electoral 
systems versus PR systems.  
To explore the consequences of the differences between majoritarian and PR systems for 
the effects of social diversity and M on party system fragmentation, this paper conducted a case 
study of Singapore, whose one-party dominant electoral system persists despite moderate levels 
of ethnic diversity and M. This case study suggested that multimember districts in majoritarian 
electoral systems may reduce, not increase, the impact of ethnic diversity on party system 
fragmentation – whilst intensifying the already negative relationship between religious diversity 
and party system fragmentation. Despite ethnic diversity, the overwhelming majority of each 
ethnic group in Singapore supports the PAP, which is promoted by the majoritarian nature of 
Singapore’s multimember districts. Similarly, Singapore’s high level of religious diversity also 
fails to produce party system fragmentation, with the overwhelming majority of each religious 
group in Singapore siding with the PAP.  
Applying these insights to party systems cross-nationally, the results presented in this 
paper illustrate two key findings. First, they suggest that while ethnic and religious diversity are 
translated into higher levels of party system fragmentation as M increases in PR systems, the 
same cannot be said of majoritarian systems. Instead, these results suggest that multimember 
districts in countries using majoritarian electoral rules limit the degree to which ethnic and 
religious diversity are translated into greater party system fragmentation. Similar to the 
experience of Singapore, majoritarian multimember districts attenuate the effect of ethnic 
diversity on party system fragmentation. Moreover, in the case of religious diversity, the results 
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show that the negative relationship between religious diversity and party system fragmentation 
becomes intensified in majoritarian multimember districts, leading to even lower levels of party 
system fragmentation.  
Second, the results presented here help us to understand how multimember districts work 
to reduce party system fragmentation in majoritarian systems. The results presented here suggest 
the reason why M is negatively associated with party system fragmentation in majoritarian 
systems is because M conditions the effects of ethnic and religious diversity, which become 
negatively associated with party system fragmentation at higher levels of M. While the effect of 
M in majoritarian systems becomes negatively associated with party system fragmentation as 
ethnic and religious diversity increase, the fact the effects of M do not reach statistical 
significance – while the effects of ethnic and religious diversity do across many values of M – 
suggests the low levels of party system fragmentation in majoritarian multimember districts are 
due more directly to the impact of the social structure than to the effects of M.  
The results presented here have two principal implications for future literature. First, 
given the differences observed between the effects of social diversity and M in PR systems 
versus those in majoritarian systems, the results suggest future research should distinguish 
between PR and majoritarian systems when modelling the effects of social diversity and M on 
party system fragmentation. Specifically, the literature needs to account for the possibility that 
while the effects of social diversity may lead to increases in party system fragmentation in PR 
systems, the results presented here suggest these effects are at least constrained in majoritarian 
systems (if not negatively associated with party system fragmentation). By the same token, the 
results presented here suggest that future research should also take into account the constraining 
effect of M – particularly as it pertains to the impact of M on the relationship between social 
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diversity and party system fragmentation – in majoritarian systems so as not to misspecify the 
effects of M under majoritarian rules or underestimate the effects of M in PR systems.  
Secondly, and as a result of the first implication, these results also have important 
ramifications for the literature on constitutional design in ethnically/religiously diverse societies. 
Of interest to centripetalist scholars, the results presented here show that higher values of M in 
majoritarian systems limit the degree to which social diversity is translated into party system 
fragmentation, and that majoritarian systems can limit party system fragmentation relative to PR 
systems. These results suggest that constitutional designers fearing excessive party system 
fragmentation in diverse societies can employ majoritarian multimember districts to limit the 
degree to which social diversity impacts party politics. Whether or not limiting the impact of 
social diversity on party system fragmentation promotes peaceful cooperation across 
ethnic/religious group lines (as is the case in Singapore) or not remains an open question; what 
the results presented here do demonstrate, however, is that the effects of social diversity on party 
system fragmentation in diverse societies can be constrained. 
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Table 1: Ethnicity and Party Preferences in Singapore in 2012 
 
             Party   
Ethnic Group  Share   PAP   Other 
Chinese  73.7%   73.4%   26.6% 
Malay   14.8%   77.0%   23.0% 
South Asian  10.4%   77.1%   22.9% 
Other   1.2%   56.3%   43.8% 
Entries are the percentages within each denomination (row) voting for each of the four 
largest parties.  Row totals may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding error.  PAP = 
People’s Action Party.  “Share” refers to the share of the sample falling into each ethnic 
group category.  Data from the 6
th
 wave of the World Values Survey.   
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Table 2: Religion and Party Preferences in Singapore in 2012 
 
             Party   
Denomination  Share   PAP   Other 
Buddhist  30.7%   77.2%   22.8% 
Taoist   9.3%   66.7%   33.3% 
Hindu   7.3%   77.6%   22.5% 
Muslim  17.0%   77.0%   23.0% 
Jewish   0.3%   82.9%   17.1% 
Protestant  10.5%   71.9%   28.1% 
Catholic  6.4%   66.8%   33.2% 
None/Other  18.6%   72.4%   27.6% 
Entries are the percentages within each denomination (row) voting for each of the four 
largest parties.  Row totals may not sum to 100 percent due to rounding error.  PAP = 
People’s Action Party.  “Share” refers to the share of the sample falling into each religious 
denomination.  Data from the 6
th
 wave of the World Values Survey.   
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates of Models Predicting Party System Fragmentation 
 
Variables      Coefficients (S.E.) 
LogEthnic      0.71*  (0.32) 
LogReligious      -1.03*  (0.45) 
LogM       3.89*  (1.95) 
LogEthnic × LogM     -2.34  (1.56) 
LogReligious × LogM     -4.37+  (2.50) 
Non-Majoritarian Systems    0.70  (0.82) 
Non-Majoritarian × LogEthnic   -0.14  (0.95) 
Non-Majoritarian × LogReligious   0.28  (0.76) 
Non-Majoritarian × LogM     -4.28*  (1.97) 
Non-Majoritarian × LogM × LogEthnic  2.78+  (1.64) 
Non-Majoritarian × LogM × LogReligious  5.02*  (2.49) 
Upper Tier      0.01  (0.01) 
ENPRES      0.17  (0.12) 
Proximity      -3.26** (0.45) 
ENPRES × Proximity     0.83**  (0.19) 
Constant      3.56**  (0.43) 
R
2
        0.37 
n        741 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests (robust standard errors clustered by country).   
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Figure 1: Party System Fragmentation in Singapore over Time
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Figure 2: The Estimated Effects of Ethnic and Religious Diversity on ENEP,
Conditional on the Electoral System (District Magnitude, PR vs. Majoritarian)
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Figure 3: The Estimated Effects of District Magnitude Conditional
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This supplemental file presents the results of several additional model specifications in 
order to determine the robustness of the findings from the model estimated in the main text. First, 
in order to determine the potential consequences to the results after addressing autocorrelation, as 
well as the impact of including data from Singapore, I estimate three models to determine the 
robustness of the findings for the model in Table 3 in the main text. Second, given previous 
research designed to explain the relationship between district magnitude and party system 
fragmentation under majoritarian electoral rules (e.g. Taagepera, 2007: 177-182), I also examine 
models incorporating these insights and applied to majoritarian systems in order to demonstrate 
the robustness of the findings relative to this alternative framework.  
 
Robustness Tests of Model 1 in Table 3 
To determine the robustness of the findings presented in the main text, I re-estimated the 
model in Table 3 in three ways. First, I re-estimated the model after including data from 
Singaporean elections and including a dummy variable to measure these elections. If the low 
levels of party system fragmentation observed in Singapore are due to the use of majoritarian 
multimember districts (rather than the ethnic quotas employed), then we should see that this 
dummy variable is not statistically significant. Moreover, we should also see that the effects of 
LogEthnic, LogReligious, and LogM should remain relatively similar to those observed in the 
main text. The results of this model appear in model S.1 in Table S.1 below.  
Additionally, I also estimated models designed to account for serial correlation. Because 
model 1 in Table 1 in the main text examines multiple elections over time, there is a concern the 
error terms at one point in time may be correlated with those in earlier time periods. While the 
use of time-series methods is problematic with country-year units of analysis that are not evenly 
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spaced (i.e. the difference between each election often differs between and/or within countries), 
it is important to determine whether accounting for possible serial correlation affects the results 
by producing under-estimated standard errors for the variables of interest. I estimate two models 
accounting for serial correlation. One uses panel-corrected standard errors adjusting for AR(1) 
serial correlation; these results appear in model S.2 in Table S.1. The other re-estimates model 1 
by adding a lagged dependent variable; the results of this model appear in model S.3. This latter 
approach is problematic for two reasons. One is because this approach includes a lagged 
dependent variable without theoretical expectations. The second is because including a lagged 
dependent variable can distort the estimated effects of the other variables in the model due to the 
correlation between these other variables and the lagged dependent variable (a problem that is 
exacerbated in this instance by the fact that the variables of theoretical interest – LogEthnic and 
LogReligious – are fixed across the time series). That being said, if the results continue to show 
that the effects of LogEthnic and LogReligious in majoritarian systems differ from those in PR 
systems, this would provide evidence supporting the results in Table 1.  
The results of these robustness tests are presented in Table S.1 alongside the coefficients 
from model 1 in the main text. Because the interaction terms make direct comparison of each 
coefficient difficult, I include linear combinations of estimates (namely, examining the predicted 
effects of LogEthnic and LogReligious when holding LogM at one) in order to show how the 
effects of LogEthnic and LogReligious change due to the impact of LogM. Comparing these with 
the coefficients for LogEthnic and LogReligious show how LogM conditions the effect of each 
variable.  
See Table S.1 below 
As with model 1 in Table 3 in the main text, the results seen in Table S.1 show that while 
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higher levels of ethnic diversity lead to higher levels of party system fragmentation, the linear 
combinations seen in models S.1 and S.2 show that the effects of ethnic diversity are reduced at 
higher levels of district magnitude. While the effect of ethnic diversity becomes stronger in 
model S.3 as district magnitude increases, this effect remains statistically insignificant. Keeping 
in mind the potential shortcomings associated with including a lagged dependent variable in this 
instance, this finding does not directly contradict the results in the main text, as the insignificant 
effect of ethnic diversity affirms the conclusion reached in the main text showing that ethnic 
diversity does not produce significantly greater levels of party system fragmentation in 
majoritarian electoral systems.  
Similar to the effects of ethnic diversity, the results in Table S.1 suggest the effects of 
religious diversity seen in Table 3 in the main text are robust to the alternative model 
specifications estimated here. In all three alternative specifications, the negative effects of 
religious diversity intensify as LogM increase. Thus, the results confirm the findings regarding 
the effect of religious diversity seen in the main text: higher levels of district magnitude produce 
even stronger negative effects of religious diversity on party system fragmentation in 
majoritarian systems.  
To visualise these effects more clearly, Figure S.1 presents the predicted effects of ethnic 
diversity – conditional on LogM – in majoritarian systems for all four models seen in Table S.1, 
while Figure S.2 presents the predicted effects of religious diversity. In all but model S.3, the 
results show that the effect of ethnic diversity weakens as district magnitude increases, with this 
effect becoming negative in models 1 and S.2 (and statistically significant in model S.2) at 
higher levels of district magnitude. While the effects of ethnic diversity remain positive in 
models S.1 and S.3, neither effect is statistically significant. Thus, while the estimated effect of 
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ethnic diversity differs somewhat sizeably from model to model, each model shows that the 
effect of ethnic diversity is weakened as district magnitude increases in majoritarian systems. 
Collectively, these results lead to the conclusion that the effects of ethnic diversity are reduced 
and insignificant in majoritarian systems.  
See Figures S.1 and S.2 below 
Turning to the effects of religious diversity, the results in Figure S.2 show that the 
negative effects of religious diversity intensify as district magnitude increases. In model S.2, as 
with model 1, this effect is statistically significant across the entire range of district magnitude; 
the effects of religious diversity nearly reach statistical significance across the range of district 
magnitude in model S.1. Although the impact of district magnitude on the effect of religious 
diversity is comparatively weaker (given the problems noted above with including a lagged 
dependent variable), the fact the negative effect of religious diversity intensifies as district 
magnitude increases in model S.3 provides additional evidence suggesting the results in model 1 
are robust. Taken together, the results presented here suggest that the effects of religious 
diversity in majoritarian systems are negative and do not become positive as district magnitude 
increases.  
In addition to examining the effects of ethnic and religious diversity, I also present the 
effects of LogM in majoritarian systems from each model, conditional on ethnic diversity (Figure 
S.3) and religious diversity (Figure S.4). As with the results seen in Figure 3 in the main text, the 
results in Figure S.3 suggest the effects of district magnitude become negative as ethnic diversity 
increases, while the results in Figure S.4 suggest the effects of district magnitude become 
negative as religious diversity increases (with the exception of the effect of district magnitude – 
conditional on ethnic diversity – in model S.3). With the exception of the effect of district 
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magnitude – conditional on ethnic diversity – in model S.2, the effects of district magnitude at 
higher levels of social diversity do not reach statistical significance – as was the case in model 1 
in Table 3. These findings reassert the conclusion reached in the main text that the impact of 
district magnitude on party system fragmentation is indirect: rather than directly reducing party 
system fragmentation, the results in each model (apart from model S.3) suggest higher levels of 
district magnitude in majoritarian systems reduce party system fragmentation indirectly by 
constraining the effects of ethnic and religious diversity.  
See Figures S.3 and S.4 below 
Taken together, the results presented here provide evidence suggesting the effects of 
district magnitude, ethnic and religious diversity are robust to alternative specifications. As with 
Figure 2 in the main text, the effects of ethnic and religious diversity are reduced, becoming 
negative, as district magnitude increases in majoritarian systems (with the exception of the effect 
of ethnic diversity in model S.3, which may be problematic given the use of a lagged dependent 
variable without clear theoretical justification). Moreover, the effects of district magnitude in 
majoritarian systems in all four models become weaker – eventually negative – as ethnic and 
religious diversity increase. The results seen here confirm the ultimate conclusion reached in 
Figure 3 in the main text regarding the effect of district magnitude in majoritarian systems. 
Rather than district magnitude per se producing decreases in party system fragmentation, the 
results presented above and in the main text collectively suggest that social diversity (particularly 
religious diversity) limits party system fragmentation in majoritarian systems; district magnitude, 
then, impacts party system fragmentation indirectly by constraining the translation of social 
diversity into party system fragmentation.  
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Restricting the Analysis to Majoritarian Systems 
Before concluding that district magnitude limits the impact of social diversity on party 
system fragmentation in majoritarian systems, it is important to address one argument designed 
specifically to explain party system fragmentation in majoritarian systems. Noting the higher 
levels of disproportionality between seat and vote shares as district magnitude increases in 
majoritarian systems (see especially Taagepera and Shugart, 1989: 265; see also Lakeman, 
1970), Taagepera (2007: 177-182) derives a model predicting that party system fragmentation 
increases as the probability that any one party can win a seat in the legislature – measured as (the 
number of seats in the legislature/mean district magnitude)
1/6
 – increases.   
To determine whether the results presented in the main text are robust when focusing 
solely on majoritarian systems, I estimate two models. These results appear in Table S.2. Each 
model restricts the sample to majoritarian systems and elections with complete information for 
both ethnic and religious diversity. One model (S.4) includes only the seat-magnitude ratio, 
while another model (S.5) includes interactions between the seat-magnitude ratio and 
ethnic/religious diversity. Examining the model including the seat-magnitude ratio alone allows 
us to compare this model with the more saturated interaction model and determine whether 
electoral system properties alone are able to explain the levels of party system fragmentation 
observed in majoritarian electoral systems, or whether one needs to account for ethnic and 
religious diversity in order to understand why district magnitude is negatively associated with 
party system fragmentation in majoritarian systems.  
See Table S.2 below 
The results for these two models are presented in Table S.2. The first thing to note is that 
the seat-magnitude ratio variable is not a statistically significant predictor in the model including 
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this variable alone (model S.4). Additionally, and relative to the more saturated model (model 
S.5), model S.4 fails to explain much variance in party system fragmentation. While most of the 
coefficients in model S.5 are not statistically significant, including the two measures of social 
diversity and the interactions with the seat-magnitude ratio significantly improve on the 
institutions-only model, as indicated by the model comparison test comparing the log likelihood 
of model S.5 to S.4. Thus, the saturated model is preferred: in order to understand why district 
magnitude is negatively associated with party system fragmentation in majoritarian electoral 
systems, one needs to take into account the interactions between electoral system permissiveness 
and ethnic/religious diversity.  
The fact the results in model S.5 mirror the results in model 1 in Table 3 in the main text 
suggests the effects of the seat-magnitude ratio are similar to those seen in the main text. This 
can be seen more clearly in Figure S.5, which presents the marginal effects of ethnic and 
religious diversity, conditional on the seat-magnitude ratio, as well as the marginal effects of the 
seat-magnitude ratio, conditional on ethnic, then religious, diversity. Here, we see that while 
there are positive relationships between ethnic and religious diversity on the one hand and party 
system fragmentation on the other at low levels of the seat-magnitude ratio – as predicted, and as 
seen with the results in model 1 in the main text – the effects of ethnic/religious diversity become 
negative at higher levels of the seat-magnitude ratio.  This is exactly in line with the findings in 
Figure 2 in the main text showing that the effects of ethnic and religious diversity become 
negatively associated with party system fragmentation at higher levels of district magnitude.  
See Figure S.5 below 
Additionally, we see that the marginal effects of the seat-magnitude ratio on party system 
fragmentation – as predicted – are positive at low levels of ethnic and religious diversity. 
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However, as with the effects of ethnic and religious diversity, the effect of the seat-magnitude 
ratio becomes negative as diversity increases. Although higher levels of the seat-magnitude ratio 
increase the probability that parties may win a seat in the legislature, the fact that the seat-
magnitude ratio is negatively associated with party system fragmentation at higher levels of 
ethnic/religious diversity is in keeping with the findings in Figure 3 showing that majoritarian 
multimember districts constrain party system fragmentation.  
 
Conclusions 
Taken together, the results of these robustness tests reaffirm the conclusions reached in 
the main text. As with the results in Figure 2 in the main text, the results in Figure S.1 suggest 
that ethnic diversity does not lead to higher levels of party system fragmentation in majoritarian 
systems – unlike in PR systems, where the results in Figure 2 suggest ethnic diversity produces 
higher levels of party system fragmentation. Additionally, the results presented in Figure S.2 
reaffirm the finding in Figure 3 suggesting that religious diversity leads to lower levels of party 
system fragmentation in majoritarian electoral systems. In both cases, the effects of social 
diversity are constrained to a greater degree by higher levels of district magnitude – leading to 
significantly lower levels of party system fragmentation, especially in the case of the seat-
magnitude ratio.  
The results presented here also reaffirm the conclusion that the low levels of party system 
fragmentation in majoritarian systems are due less to the effects of electoral institutions than the 
impact of social diversity. In the figures presented here, district magnitude and the seat-
magnitude ratio do not directly produce significantly lower levels of party system fragmentation. 
Instead, and as seen in Figures 2 and 3 in the main text, the results in Figures S.3-S.5 suggest that 
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electoral institutions do place significant constraints on the effects of ethnic and religious 
diversity. Unlike in PR systems, higher levels of district magnitude do not result in significantly 
higher levels of party system fragmentation; rather, district magnitude impacts party system 
fragmentation by constraining the effects of social diversity. In sum, the results presented in 
these robustness tests largely confirm the conclusions reached in the main text.  
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Table S.1: Parameter Estimates of Models Predicting Party System Fragmentation 
 
                 Models     
Variables       1   S.1   S.2   S.3 
Lagged ENEP    -  -  -  0.68** 
LogEthnic    0.71*  0.69*  0.53**  0.28 
LogReligious    -1.03*  -1.14*  -1.19** -0.18 
LogM     3.89  1.36  2.33*  -0.18 
LogEthnic × LogM   -2.34  -0.10  -2.26** 0.45 
LogReligious × LogM   -4.37+  -0.95  -2.18  -0.32 
Non-Majoritarian Systems  0.70  0.61  0.14  0.73 
Non-Majoritarian ×  
LogEthnic    -0.14  -0.12  -0.10  -0.30 
Non-Majoritarian ×  
LogReligious    0.28  0.39  0.65  -0.28 
Non-Majoritarian × LogM   -4.28*  -1.76+  -2.63** -0.82 
Non-Majoritarian ×  
LogM × LogEthnic   2.78+  0.55  2.58**  -0.21 
Non-Majoritarian ×  
LogM × LogReligious   5.02*  1.61  2.78*  0.72 
Upper Tier    0.01  0.01  0.01**  0.00 
ENPRES    0.17  0.17  0.24**  0.08 
Proximity    -3.26** -3.24** -1.18** -1.08** 
ENPRES × Proximity   0.83**  0.83**  0.27*  0.27+ 
Singapore    -  0.21  -  - 
Constant    3.56**  3.65**  3.71**  0.93** 
Linear Combinations 
LogEthnic × (LogM × 1)  -1.63  0.59  -1.73*  0.85 
LogReligious × (LogM × 1)  -5.40*  -2.09+  -3.37*  -0.50 
R
2
      0.37  0.38  0.32  0.68 
n      741  753  741  644 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests. Entries are linear regression coefficients. Models 1, S.1, and S.3 
use linear regression with standard errors clustered by country. Model S.2 uses panel-corrected standard errors 
assuming AR(1) serial correlation.  
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Table S.2: Parameter Estimates of Models Predicting Party System Fragmentation in 
Majoritarian Systems 
 
                Models   
Variables      S.4   S.5  
 (Seats/M)
1/6
      0.57  3.55 
LogEthnic     -  1.74 
LogReligious     -  4.95 
(Seats/M)
1/6
 × LogEthnic   -  -0.67 
(Seats/M)
1/6
 × LogReligious   -  -2.85 
Constant     1.80  -3.77 
Linear Combinations 
LogEthnic × ((Seats/M)1/6 × 1)  -  1.07 
LogReligious × ((Seats/M)1/6 × 1)  -  2.11 
Model Comparison    -  58.53** 
R
2
       0.02  0.25 
n       249  249 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, two-tailed tests (using robust standard errors clustered by country). 
Entries in the top half of the table are linear regression coefficients. ‘Model Comparison’ 
refers to the results of likelihood ratio test comparing the log likelihood of the saturated 
model (S.5) with the institutions-only model (S.4).  
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Figure S.1: Marginal Effects of Ethnic Diversity
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Figure S.2: Marginal Effects of Religious Diversity
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Figure S.3: Marginal Effects of LogM (Conditional on LogEthnic)
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Figure S.4: Marginal Effects of LogM (Conditional on LogReligious)
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Figure S.5: Marginal Effects (from Model S.5)
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1
 Replication materials for this paper will be made available at the author’s personal webpage.  
2
 Specifically, the effective number of parties is calculated as  
𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑃 = 1/∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
where pi is the share of the vote won by party i.  
3
 To account for the lack of information for some parties whose specific vote shares are lost 
when several smaller parties’ vote shares are reported as one combined ‘other’ party vote share, I 
also ran models applying Taagepera’s (1997) correction. The results using this alternative 
measure confirm those presented here.  
4
 I omit interactions between each measure of diversity and Upper Tier because these 
coefficients do not reach statistical significance – as other recent research (Li and Shugart, 2016) 
has found.  
5
 One concern with analysing a broad range of countries is that the results may not address the 
predictions of the relationship between M and party system fragmentation in majoritarian 
systems seen in Taagepera (2007). Restricting the analysis to majoritarian elections and 
accounting for the specific argument made by Taagepera produces conclusions similar to those 
presented here (see the supplemental file).  
6
 I also estimated models designed to account for possible serial correlation in order to determine 
the robustness of the findings presented here. The results of these robustness tests (which can be 
seen in the supplemental file) generally confirm those presented here.  
